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Many theories, based on neuroscientific and psychological empirical evidence and on com-
putational concepts, have been elaborated to explain the emergence of consciousness in the
central nervous system. These theories propose key fundamental mechanisms to explain con-
sciousness, but they only partially connect such mechanisms to the possible functional and
adaptive role of consciousness. Recently, some cognitive and neuroscientific models try to
solve this gap by linking consciousness to various aspects of goal-directed behaviour, the piv-
otal cognitive process that allows mammals to flexibly act in challenging environments. Here
we propose the Representation Internal-Manipulation (RIM) theory of consciousness, a theory
that links the main elements of consciousness theories to components and functions of goal-
directed behaviour, ascribing a central role for consciousness to the goal-directed manipulation
of internal representations. This manipulation relies on four specific computational operations
to perform the flexible internal adaptation of all key elements of goal-directed computation,
from the representations of objects to those of goals, actions, and plans. Finally, we propose
the concept of ‘manipulation agency’ relating the sense of agency to the internal manipulation
of representations. This allows us to propose that the subjective experience of consciousness
is associated to the human capacity to generate and control a simulated internal reality that
is vividly perceived and felt through the same perceptual and emotional mechanisms used to
tackle the external world.
1The authors have equally contributed to the paper.
Introduction
Scientific theories of consciousness often focus on spe-
cific key mechanisms possibly relevant for it such as the neu-
ronal networks that support conscious processing (Dehaene
& Changeux, 2011; Dehaene, Kerszberg, & Changeux, 1998;
Dehaene & Naccache, 2001), their informational integra-
tion (Koch, Massimini, Boly, & Tononi, 2016; Tononi, 2008;
Tononi, Boly, Massimini, & Koch, 2016), the brain hierar-
chies (Damasio, 1989; Meyer & Damasio, 2009), and the
sensorimotor interactions involving brain, body, and the en-
vironment (O’Regan & Noe, 2001; O’Regan, Myin, & Noë,
2005).
Similarly to Baars’ approach stressing the possible func-
tional elements and adaptive role of conscious cognition
(Baars, 1997, 2005; Baars, Franklin, & Ramsoy, 2013;
Baars, Ramsøy, & Laureys, 2003), our approach to con-
sciousness strongly focuses on the importance of consider-
ing the functional (adaptive) aspects of consciousness along-
side the possible mechanisms that might support them, inte-
grated to form a coherent system. In particular, here we pro-
pose a strong link between the main features of conscious-
ness highlighted by the aforementioned theories and the pro-
cesses and mechanisms involved in goal-directed behaviour
(Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Hills, 2006; Mannella, Gur-
ney, & Baldassarre, 2013). Goal-directed processes allow
complex organisms to adapt to novel challenges of the envi-
ronment through complex forms of mental simulation (Ger-
lach, Spreng, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2011; Pezzulo, Rigoli,
& Chersi, 2013) allowing them to plan actions ahead, to
support complex decision making, and to solve challenging
problems. Despite various authors mention possible links be-
tween consciousness and goal-directed processes (e.g., Ben-
gio, 2017; Chiappe & MacDonald, 2005; Keller, 2014; Pen-
nartz, 2017; Ressler, 2004; Rossano, 2003), how the compu-
tational processes underlying goal-directed behaviour might
be specifically related to conscious processing remains elu-
sive.
Here we propose the Representation Internal-
Manipulation (RIM) theory of consciousness. The theory
posits that consciousness emerges within the goal-directed
system of brain pivoting on this key main components
and processes: a set of working memories mediating
perception and imagination, an abstract working memory
representing the main elements of goal-directed processes,
a selection process (‘internal manipulator’) manipulating
internal representations at all levels, and a motivational
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system driving the manipulator. In this proposal, a central
role for consciousness is played by the goal-directed
manipulation of internal representations. This manipulation
process performs four classes of computational operations
on internal representations: decomposition, composition,
abstraction, and specification. The key adaptive function
played by consciousness through these operations is to
flexibly modify as desired all key elements of goal-directed
processes, from the representations of objects and contexts
to those of goals, actions, and plans. The theory allows the
integration of the key elements proposed by the theories on
consciousness while at the same time ascribing to them a
functional/adaptive valence.
Finally, we relate the internal manipulation of representa-
tions to the sense of agency. This allows us to contribute to
face the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ (Chalmers, 1995),
in particular to propose a possible explanation of the subjec-
tive experience that accompanies conscious processes (Den-
nett, 1988; Haggard, 2017). The contribution rests on a novel
concept that we formulate here, of ‘manipulation agency’.
The idea is that the internal manipulation system under-
lying consciousness allows humans to actively and flexi-
bly generate, control, and change as desired an internal
simulated/imagined reality. The sense of agency given by
this flexible and powerful control, together with the vividly
sensed and felt experience of the imagined reality that is pro-
cessed through the same perceptual and emotional mecha-
nisms used to tackle the external world, gives rise to the sub-
jective experience accompanying consciousness.
Overview of some theories of consciousness
Many theories have been proposed to explain conscious-
ness as a propriety emergent from specific mechanisms of
brain. Here we consider some major theories that propose
articulated systems of concepts on consciousness that give a
reasonable coverage of the relevant ideas on consciousness
also developed in other theories. We start from the theory
of Baars that has the merit to more strongly aim to propose
a functional interpretation of conscious processes, i.e. which
cognitive functions useful for adaptation these might play, an
aim that we also follow here.
The global workspace theory of Baars (GWT, Baars 1997)
proposes that consciousness relies on a set of fundamental
elements that might metaphorically correspond to the ele-
ments of a theatre, the ‘theatre of consciousness’. The fun-
damental elements are the conscious contents such as per-
cepts, thoughts, and judgements (‘actors in the stage’), the
global workspace of working memory where conscious con-
tents are represented (‘theatre stage’), the selective attention
that allocates limited processing resources to specific con-
tents (‘theatre spotlight’), the executive functions (‘director’)
that, on the basis of the agent’s current goals, decide which
contents to activate, the unconscious background processes
(‘audience’), that contribute to furnish row information to
the conscious contents (e.g. contextual information). The
author recently grounded the model on neuroscientific evi-
dence (Baars, 2005; Baars et al., 2013, 2003), in particular
by linking the ‘theatre elements’ with neural structures and
processes. Baars’ theory follows an approach that best fits
our functional approach to consciousness, and in this respect
it can be considered a precursor of our proposal.
A related biologically-grounded theory, the neuronal
workspace model (NWM; Dehaene and Changeux 2011),
proposes the existence of two computational sub-spaces of
brain networks to explain the emergence of conscious expe-
rience. A first sub-space is formed by many specialised func-
tional modules (e.g., sensory areas or motor systems) char-
acterised by high-density short/medium range connections.
A second sub-space is formed by a distributed set of neu-
rons, communicating trough excitatory long-range projec-
tions, involving the associative cortices (prefrontal, parieto-
temporal, and cingulate cortex) and including the fibers of
corpus callosum and of the cortico-thalamic system (De-
haene & Changeux, 2011). The NWM has been extended
to envisage the existence of buffers (working memories) be-
tween the sensorial cortices and the neuronal workspace
(Raffone, Srinivasan, & van Leeuwen, 2014, 2015). Based
on these anatomical organisation, the model proposes that
the reverberating networks formed by the top-down projec-
tions (second interconnected computational space) and the
bottom-up projections (first computational space) implement
specific selective processes that lead to the emergence of a
restricted set of relevant contents within consciousness.
Another influential theory of consciousness, the inte-
grated information theory (IIT; Tononi 2008; Tononi et al.
2016), proposes that a high anatomical and functional in-
tegration of a key brain sub-network, namely the thalamo-
cortical system, represents a critical element of conscious-
ness. In particular, this theory proposes that the represen-
tations of the thalamo-cortical system are characterised by
‘specificity’, i.e. an substantial level of differentiation and
segregation with respect to other competitive representations,
and ‘integration’, i.e. a relevant level of information ex-
changed by the units that compose the same representation.
A major strength of the theory is the proposal of a quanti-
tative measure of the level of such specificity and integra-
tion, namely the Φ value. The theory postulates that a high
Φ value represents the neural correlate of a subjective con-
sciousness state. A recent update of the theory (Koch et al.,
2016) distinguishes a brain hot zone that supports the forma-
tion of conscious contents localised in the posterior cortices
and a frontal-parietal system that supports task-monitoring
processes, making conscious contents coherent.
Damasio (Damasio, 1989; Meyer & Damasio, 2009)
has proposed another relevant theory, the convergence-
divergence zones theory (CDZt), that focuses on the hierar-
CONSCIOUS MANIPULATION OF INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS 3
chical organisation of brain systems to explain the difference
between conscious and subconscious representations. In par-
ticular, this theory postulates the existence of minor conver-
gence zones, corresponding to the sensory cortices, and a
major central convergence zone, corresponding to associa-
tive cortical areas (prefrontal cortex, parietal cortex, and tem-
poral cortex), that together form a hierarchy of convergence
zones. The theory proposes that this architecture supports
a progressive integration of information from perceptual to
central areas that supports perceptual processes, and an in-
verse flow of information that supports imaginary processes.
The theory also focuses on the emotional dimension of con-
scious experience by referring to the somatic marker theory
to explain the emotional nuance of conscious representations
(Bechara & Damasio, 2005). In particular, the term ‘somatic
marker’ refers to the influence, taking place within the major
associative convergence zones, of somatic signals onto brain
representations that thus receive a prioritisation bias for be-
ing consciously processed (Verdejo-García, Pérez-García, &
Bechara, 2006).
O’Regan (O’Regan & Noe, 2001; O’Regan et al., 2005)
proposed a sensorimotor theory of consciousness that, in
line with the approaches of embodied cognition (Ander-
son, 2003; Borghi & Cimatti, 2010; Garbarini & Adenzato,
2004) and enactivism (Hutto, 2005), goes beyond strictly
cognitive processes to involve the close interaction between
brain, body, and environment. In particular, the theory ex-
plains the features of conscious visual experience, proposing
that ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ (the perception of world
changes caused by actions) are fundamental features for the
emergence of conscious experience. Furthermore, this the-
ory explains the difference between a sensory experience
and other types of neural processes (e.g. imagination or
reasoning) suggesting the existence of two properties of
action-contingent stimuli defined ‘allerting’ and ‘corporal-
ity’. While allerting corresponds to the capacity of chang-
ing stimuli to exogenously attract our attention, corporality
describes a phenomenal change of perception that is conse-
quent to a motor act of the agent.
The goal-directed system
Goal-directed behaviour relies on sophisticated internal
representations, such as the representations of objects, goals,
and world models, and is involved in many higher order cog-
nitive processes such as planning, reasoning, and problem
solving. In this section we present contributions from differ-
ent disciplines, in particular neurobiology, neuropsychology,
psychology, and computational literature, that clarify rele-
vant aspects of the processes that underlie goal directed be-
haviour in brain, behaviour, and artificial intelligence sys-
tems. The contributions are in part overlapping; they are also
so wide that here we can only consider few main aspects of
them.
Biological contributions
Given a specific condition of the environment, goal-
directed behaviour allows an agent to exhibit different be-
haviours depending on the goal that it intends to pur-
sue. In particular, the behaviour is not automatically trig-
gered by specific stimuli, as in habitual behaviour relying
on stimulus-response (S-R) associations (Yin & Knowlton,
2006). Rather, it is guided by the future desired environment
states on the basis of previously acquired action-outcome (A-
O) associations (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998). Goal-directed
behaviour, initially studied in animal species such as rats,
is phylogenetically more recent than habitual behaviour and
relies on the evolutionary emergence of complex brain pro-
cesses (Passingham & Wise, 2012). Among these, planning
processes allow animals to flexibly assemble sequences of
actions in novel ways (Delatour & Gisquet-Verrier, 2000;
Pfeiffer & Foster, 2013), reasoning processes allow the infer-
ence of new knowledge from previously acquired informa-
tion (Aust, Range, Steurer, & Huber, 2008; Blaisdell, Sawa,
Leising, & Waldmann, 2006), and problem solving processes
allow the accomplishment of new goals by adjusting previ-
ously acquired knowledge (Newman, Carpenter, Varma, &
Just, 2003).
We now consider some main aspects of the brain goal-
directed system (for more details, see Baldassarre, Caligiore,
& Mannella, 2013; Caligiore, Arbib, Miall, & Baldassarre,
2019; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010).
States and the cortical pathways. Brain processes per-
ceptual information through multiple hierarchies of cortical
areas partially segregated by sensory modality, e.g. for hear-
ing or vision (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). For example,
visual information is processed from early occipital cortex,
performing basic information processing such as the detec-
tion of image edges, towards higher associative cortices, pro-
cessing information for object identification in the infero-
temporal cortex (‘ventral visual pathway’) or for supporting
the interaction with object based on and supporting object
interaction, e.g. related to space location and size encoded
in the parietal cortex (‘dorsal visual pathway’; Goodale &
Milner, 1992). These areas support action performance by
sending information to motor cortices (Rizzolatti, Luppino,
& Matelli, 1998). They also send information to the multi-
modal integrative areas of prefrontal cortex (Passingham &
Wise, 2012), which then exert a top-down control both over
motor areas and backward towards the perceptual cortical hi-
erarchies to support attentional processes.
Goals and frontal cortex. Goals represent the pivotal
components of goal-directed behaviour that distinguish it
from habitual behaviour. In particular, within the behavioural
psychology literature a goal is defined as an action out-
come having biological value, such as a food pellet, that can
drive the performance of a behaviour for the balancing of
homeostasis (i.e for the satisfaction of an homeostatic drive;
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Balleine and Dickinson 1998; Berridge 2004). More in gen-
eral, in cognitive sciences a goal is defined as an internal
representation of a desirable future state of the world. This
representation can be internally re-activated, in the absence
of its referent in the environment, for triggering actions di-
rected to accomplish the world state corresponding to the
goal (Thill, Caligiore, Borghi, Ziemke, & Baldassarre, 2013).
A goal representation (e.g., the internal representation of a
food pellet) can be supported by different sensory modalities,
as the smell and visual appearance, and by different hierar-
chical processes with an increasing level of abstraction and
integration of sensory modalities (Mechelli, Price, Friston,
& Ishai, 2004). In the human brain, goals are formed within
the orbitofrontal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex
and are given motivational valence by lower-level represen-
tations within amygdala and nucleus accumbens (Mannella
et al., 2013; Mirolli, Mannella, & Baldassarre, 2010; Roy,
Shohamy, & Wager, 2012). Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
also encodes the more complex and abstract rules/situations
that are instrumental for the attainment of biologicallyrele-
vant outcomes (Tsujimoto, Genovesio, & Wise, 2011).
Selection and the basal ganglia. A key brain mecha-
nism supporting the selection of goal-directed behaviour el-
ements, such as states, goals, and actions, is implemented by
basal-ganglia (Redgrave, Prescott, & Gurney, 1999). These
form basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loops that originate
from the associative and frontal regions of cortex, and feed-
back onto the same regions via the thalamus. These loops are
partially segregated into parts specialised to support selection
of cortical contents involving in particular (Yin & Knowlton,
2006): motor cortices; associative cortices (parietal, tempo-
ral, and dorsal prefrontal cortex); and limbic cortices (orbital
and ventromedial preforntal cortex). An overall fundamental
pattern of brain is the one where the cortical pathways dis-
cussed above, hosting bottom-up and top-down information
flow, are ‘intercepted’ by the basal-ganglia loops that per-
form selection of contents within them (Baldassarre, Cali-
giore, & Mannella, 2013). We will see that this pattern is
very important for the internal manipulation of information
of the RIM theory proposed here.
Motivations. Motivations represent another component
of GDB, strongly related to the formation and the internal
activation of goals. In particular motivations are internal
processes that, based on the organism’s ‘needs’, guide the
selection of certain behaviours and the modulation of other
internal processes such as attention and learning. There are
various types of motivations, but in general literature divided
them in extrinsic (Panksepp, 1998) and intrinsic motivations
(Baldassarre, 2011). Extrinsic motivations refer to the basic
physiological motivations linked to survival and the repro-
duction such as pain, hunger, and thirst (Panksepp, 1998).
These motivations can lead to form goals, for example in the
form of visual/auditive internal representations of the envi-
ronment resources that can satisfy them (e.g. food or water).
In brain, extrinsic motivations are supported by areas such as
the hypothalamus and amygdala and involve reward-related
systems such as the dopamine system (Schultz, 2002).
Intrinsic motivation, endowed with a more sophisticated
cognition (Baldassarre & Mirolli, 2013; Deci, Vallerand, Pel-
letier, & Ryan, 1991; Fantz, 1964; White, 1959) drive the
acquisition of knowledge that might be later employed for
the acquisition of biological relevant resources and are re-
lated to processes such as curiosity, exploration, play, nov-
elty, surprise, the setting of own goals and the competence to
accomplish them. Intrinsic motivations involve various brain
structures, for example hippocampus for novelty detection
(Kumaran & Maguire, 2007; Lisman & Grace, 2005) or the
anterior cingulate cortex for surprise (O’Reilly et al., 2013;
Paus, 2001). Also intrinsic motivations can support the for-
mation of goals (Baldassarre, Mannella, et al., 2013).
Psychological contributions
Attention. Attention is a relevant process for goal-
directed behaviour Attention processes allow the acquisition
of relevant information while discarding irrelevant stimuli
(selective attention; Treisman & Gelade, 1980). They are
also fundamental for the formation of goals formation and
their internal re-activation. Attention can be divided in covert
vs. overt attention (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004;
Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umiltá, 1987), endogenous
(‘bottom-up’) vs. exogenous (‘top-down’) attention (Posner
& Petersen, 1990).
Overt attention refers to the selection of environment in-
formation based on the control of sensors focusing on a par-
ticular portion of the environment or stimuli (e.g. the view
of a food pellet regardless of the context where it is found).
Covert attention refers to an internal selection process that
can mentally isolate the relevant parts of an internal repre-
sentation (e.g. to internally focus on a certain portion of an
imagined scene). Both covert and overt attention can support
the formation of focused representations of states, goals, and
models of the world.
Regarding the second distinction, exogenous attention
refers to externally-driven shifts of the attention focus,
mostly caused by highly salient stimuli or stimulus changes,
while endogenous attention involves a voluntary shift driven
by the agents’ goals (Ognibene & Baldassarre, 2015). En-
dogenous attention is very important for goal-directed be-
haviour because it allows the internal activate of desired
goals and also support reasoning processes and planning pro-
cesses that rely on a serial scan of mental contents. These
processes strongly rely on top-down driven sensory imagi-
nation processes (Mechelli et al., 2004; Seepanomwan, Cali-
giore, Cangelosi, & Baldassarre, 2015).
Planning. Given a selected goal, planning processes use
the knowledge on action-outcome contingencies to search a
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single action or an action sequence that leads to accomplish
the desired goal (Delatour & Gisquet-Verrier, 2000; Pfeif-
fer & Foster, 2013). In humans, this searching process is
supported by an ‘internal simulation’ assembling and test-
ing actions sequences ‘within the mind’ rather than by acting
in the environment in humans (Gerlach et al., 2011). These
processes might also involve non-human animals (Balleine
& Dickinson, 1998; Clayton & Dickinson, 2010). Planning
processes are also supported by bottom-up mechanisms such
as affordances that suggest the possible actions that could be
useful and appropriate for a given condition or object (Gar-
barini & Adenzato, 2004; Rounis & Humphreys, 2015; Thill
et al., 2013).
Problem solving. Problem solving is a sophisticated
version of planning, considered a fundamental element of hu-
man intelligence in early cognitive-science studies (Simon,
1975). In early views, problem solving identifies the a flex-
ible search of the correct sequence of actions to pass from
an initial state to a final desired state (goal), so is analogous
to planning. This view still has an important role in current
artificial intelligence models and cognitive science interpre-
tations of human problem solving (e.g. Condell et al. 2010;
Waltz et al. 1999), but it overlooks the fact that life prob-
lem solving requires not only to find suitable sequences of
actions to achieve the goal, but also to face knowledge gaps
regarding the elements of planning, for examples the relevant
objects, their functions, the actions to act on them, and the
possible effects of actions (world model).
Neuro-psychological contributions
Executive functions. The neuro-psychology literature
studies a set of processes defined ‘executive functions’ (Di-
amond, 2013; Miyake et al., 2000) that have a notable over-
lap with goal-directed behaviour processes studied in the bi-
ological literature but also add useful information. Executive
functions support a coherent feedback-dependent goal-based
top-down control of behaviour and rely on three fundamen-
tal processes, i.e. working memory, inhibitory control, and
cognitive flexibility.
Working memory. Working memory, also studied in
psychology, is a fundamental process for goal-directed be-
haviour referring to the capacity of the brain to keep ac-
tive information representations for prolongued periods of
time. Without the persistent maintenance of information
by working memory cognition could support only sensori-
motor behaviours. Working memory can store information
in a modality-specific form (Fiehler, Burke, Engel, Bien,
& Rösler, 2008; Raffone et al., 2014) or in an highly inte-
grated multimodal form (Baddeley, 2000; Wolters & Raf-
fone, 2008). Working memory is a fundamental process for
the selection and active maintenance of goals and sub-goals,
and for supporting planning and problem solving processes
through the maintenance of representations regarding past or
future world states and their possible causal/temporal links
(world models).
Inhibitory control. Working memory processes have a
synergistic interaction with inhibition processes, another fun-
damental key element underlying goal-directed behaviour.
Inhibitory control allowing the focus on the selected goals
by performing a continuous suppression of distractors, such
as other goals, intervening stimuli, and irrelevant actions
(Durston et al., 2002).
Cognitive flexibility. The integrated interaction of work-
ing memory and inhibitory control allows the emergence of
a third process defined, cognitive flexibility, related to the
capacity to switch behavioural strategy depending on the ex-
ternal conditions. For example, in a . The integrated func-
tioning of working-memory, inhibitory control, and cogni-
tive flexibility allows the emergence of high-order forms of
executive functions such as goal monitoring, planning, and
problems solving.
Studies regarding the neural correlate of executive func-
tions (Goldman-Rakic, 1996; Hartley & Speer, 2000; Robin-
son, Calamia, Gläscher, Bruss, & Tranel, 2014) highlight
many structures that support goal-directed behaviour. In
particular, working memory is suppo,rted by basal ganglia-
cortical loops, hippocampus and high-order prefrontal cor-
tices while inhibitory control mostly relies on basal-ganglia,
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex
(Durston et al., 2002). Cognitive flexibility relies on a com-
plex network involving various portions of basal-ganglia,
prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and parietal cor-
tex (Leber, Turk-Browne, & Chun, 2008). The monitoring of
the attainment of sub-goals and final goals relies on frontal
portions of prefrontal cortex (Desrochers, Burk, Badre, &
Sheinberg, 2015) while the anterior cingulate cortex shows
a strong involvement in the detection of the violation of ex-
pectations (Benn et al., 2014).
Artificial intelligence contributions
Research on artificial intelligence, that initially was
closely linked to the study of natural intelligence, gave an
important theoretical foundation to the study of goal-directed
processes (Russell & Norvig, 2016). A first relevant con-
tribution was the one on problem solving introduced above,
positing that human intelligence is primarily directed to ac-
complish goals by searching suitable sequences of actions
leading from an initial state to a final goal state passing
through a number of intermediate sub-goals (Simon, 1975).
These processes involved the representation of the world
states as whole elements, such as the configuration of the
pieces on the board in the chess game.
Later this approach was developed by the research on
planning that made the search of action sequences more effi-
cient by factorising the representation of states into elements
(e.g. ‘objects’) and relations between elements (e.g., ‘being
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on’, ‘being part of’) suitably expressed with logic symbols
(Russell & Norvig, 2016). On this basis, planning systems
could hence focus and reason on fewer relevant elements and
relations at a time.
This thread of research mostly proceeded in parallel with
respect to the research on neural networks (McClelland & the
PDPResearchGroup, 1986), which has lately arrived to the
great success of machine learning and deep neural networks
(Goodfellow, Bengio, & Courville, 2017). This success is
now bringing new interest and energies to face the high-level
problems tackled by planning and problem solving by us-
ing approaches based on neural networks (e.g., Baldassarre,
2001; Wayne et al., 2018), a trend that is expected to deliver
good outcomes also to the research on consciousness (e.g.,
see Bengio, 2017).
The Representation Internal-Manipulation (RIM)
theory of consciousness: components and manipulation
operations
In this section we present the Representation Internal-
Manipulation (RIM) theory of consciousness, in particular
the main ‘components’, or set of functions, that the theory
posits to be at the core of consciousness processes (Figure 1).
As the brain works as a whole, these ‘components’ should be
thought to have a limited segregation in brain, i.e. to have
a relative overlap within the brain structures that implement
them (Caligiore et al., 2019).
(1) Perceptual working memory. This component is re-
sponsible for a bottom-up information processing supporting
modal perception (visual, auditive, tactile, somatosensory,
etc.) and the formation of increasingly abstract representa-
tions, e.g. it supports the processing of visual images from
the retina and the formation of increasingly abstract repre-
sentations, from low-level visual features (edges, corners,
etc.) to higher level representations (more complex features,
objects, and faces). The same component also supports a
top-down information flow moving in the opposite direction
and supporting imagination, i.e. the central re-activation of
peripheral perceptual representations. The component, sup-
ported in brain by reverberating loops involving sensory cor-
tices, has the capacity to implement modal working memo-
ries able to maintain active perceptual representations having
a high level of details and possibly several dimensions. These
activations also represent the conscious contents of which we
are aware.
(2) Abstract working-memory. This component sup-
ports the active maintenance of goals and behavioural strate-
gies in more abstract multimodal formats. This component,
mostly supported by fronto-striatal circuits, forming rever-
berating loops with thalamus and basal ganglia, has the ca-
pacity of maintaining abstract representations of the world
elements (context, objects, other agents), and of goals and
action plans. These representations can be activated or de-
activated as needed on the basis of the current condition, the
goals to pursue, and the plans, decisions, and thoughts for-
mulated to accomplish them.
(3) Top-down internal manipulator. This component,
guided by motivationally-charged active goals, activates spe-
cific contents within the abstract working memory and the
perceptual working memories, in particular by ‘manipulat-
ing’ them so to best use the agent’s knowledge to pursue
the currently desired goals. This component is actually fully
embedded into the other three components. In particular, it
is implemented by the biases from the motivational compo-
nent, and by the selection processes internal to the abstract
and perceptual working memories. The ‘component’ in par-
ticular relies on the excitatory fronto-parietal cortical path-
ways for the top-down guidance, on the disinhibition mecha-
nisms of basal ganglia for performing macro selections, and
on the local inhibitiory circuits of cortex for performing mi-
cro selections. The component allows the conscious flexi-
ble manipulation and morphing of externally-driven percepts
(e.g., visual or somatosensory representations) and of self-
activated representations (imagination). The internal manip-
ulator represents the keystone of the RIM theory.
(4) Motivation system. This component, supported in
the brain by sub-cortical emotional systems such as the hy-
pothalamus, amygdala, hippocampus, and the nucleus ac-
cumbens, furnishes the motivational valence to the represen-
tations within the other components. In particular, it supports
the selection/activation of specific goals within the abstract
working memory, thus forming ‘intentions’, and also sup-
ports the selection of other relevant elements, for example
enhances the activation of representations related to objects
and sub-goals relevant to support intentional behaviour.
The four components support the internal manipulation
of representations proposed here to be at the core of con-
sciousness. The manipulator performs operations that can be
grouped into four classes (Figure 2). We extracted these four
classes of operations from neuro-psychological and neuro-
scientific literature, for example on executive functions, at-
tention, the selective processes of basal ganglia, and the hi-
erarchical organisation of cortex. We think these operations
are the main means through which conscious processing sup-
ports flexible goal-directed planning and problem solving.
The four classes of operations are as follows.
(1) Decomposition. This operation, linked to the con-
cept of selective attention, allows the separation of whole
representations into pieces, thus allowing the agent to focus
on single elements (e.g., objects in the world or specific sub-
goals) and their parts. This operation supports the focusing
on specific portions of representations based on spatial reg-
ularities (space-based) or functional/visual regularities (e.g.,
object-based).
(2) Composition. A ‘chunk’, or ‘composition’, is a
group of elements glued together by a higher-level seman-
tic link (e.g., the eyes, nose, and mouth together form a
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Neuro-Functional Elements of the Representation Internal-Manipulation (RIM) Theory
Figure 1. Schema showing the components of the RIM theory of consciousness. The colour gradient (red to blue) indicates
a gradual change of computational functions from those encoding emotional/motivational elements (e.g. goals; fronto-striatal
cortex) to those encoding perceptual elements (e.g. visual activations; occipital and dorso-caudal cortex)
face). Neurally, a chunk can be implemented by connections
that link the neural representations of the different elements
and/or connections that link them to another neural repre-
sentation of the semantic link. The connections allow the
activation of the neural representation of the semantic link
when needed, and to use it in place of the representations
of the elements of the composition. Alongside such struc-
tural chunks, the composition also allows the formation of
chunks through a functional connectivity, for example based
on the synchronous firing of spiking-neurons encoding the
items of to be chunked. Composition supports the assem-
bling of items relevant for many goal-directed processes, for
example the creation of action sequences forming a plan, or
to consider wholes useful for problem solving.
(3) Abstraction. This operation allows the activation of
internal representations that have less details or dimensions
with respect to some original representations. There exist
multiple possible abstractions of a pattern depending on the
information that is preserved or discarded, so the process of
abstraction needs to be biased in a specific direction. Ab-
straction is obtained by several features contributing to form
more complex features or to identify the ‘hidden causes’ of
given patterns. Abstraction is at the basis of the capacity of
humans to consider specific aspects of objects while ignor-
ing others, for example to focus on the colour, or the size, or
the shape of an object. Furthermore, abstraction is strongly
linked to the capacity to create simplified/compact represen-
tations of the world.
(4) Specification. Specification represents the inverse
operation with respect to abstraction, in particular it adds
details and dimensions to original abstract representations.
Since specification implies few-to-many mappings, it re-
quires that the process of specification is biased towards a
desired direction. Neurally, specification is implemented by
passing from abstract to more specific representations, for
example by passing from hidden causes to full representa-
tions, for example to imagine some details of the face of a
known person. This operation, together with composition,
is thus behind the capacity of adding details to ideas and of
imagining and creating new elements.
Conscious Knowledge Transfer (CKT). The integrated
functioning of the four operations give rise to a super-
ordinate function called here conscious knowledge transfer.
CKT is an enhanced version of generalisation, intended here
as the capacity of neural networks to respond in similar ways
to similar stimuli; generalisation is in particular based on the
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interpolation between previous experiences or the extrapo-
lation very proximal to such experiences. For example, an
agent might experience an object on various positions at the
centre of the table and on this basis imagine it a bit outside
such centre (Nair et al., 2018). Instead, CKT implies the
capacity of extrapolating knowledge far beyond previous ex-
periences, e.g. to imagine an object anywhere in a known
space. Moreover, CKT involves all types of flexible active
construction of knowledge that, starting from experience, can
build fully new knowledge on the basis of the regularities ex-
tracted from such knowledge, for example those related to
the physical properties of the environment, and to natural-
istic and social knowledge (Lake, Ullman, Tenenbaum, &
Gershman, 2017). This construction of knowledge relies on
knowledge building processes such as analogy (Gentner &
Forbus, 2011), induction, and other types of inference.
All these processes allow conscious agents to flexibly
‘warp and morph’ all elements of planning, such as contexts,
objects, goals/sub-goals, and actions, in order to accomplish
the desired goals in the lack of sufficient knowledge (flex-
ible problem solving). For example, a goal might be split
in never-experienced sub-goals trough decomposition; a new
function of an object might be found by ‘importing’ it from
another object through abstraction (which allows to see simi-
larities), and by linking it to the object by composition; a plan
might be searched at different levels of abstractions through
abstraction and specification of objects/states and actions.
Overall, these abilities are at the core of the flexible solu-
tion of new problems. New problems are challenging exactly
because their solution requires knowledge that the agent ini-
tially does not have, and that has to be built through CKT
processes. For example, in the classic problem of Duncker
(Duncker, 1945), formulated within the psychological litera-
ture on problem solving, a participant has to solve a problem
of fixing a candle on a wall, and light it with some matches,
using some pins in a box. The solution is to pin the cardboard
box of the pins to the wall, and then to put the candle on
it. Finding this solution requires to use abstraction to realise
that the box is made of cardboard, and so can be pinned onto
the wall, and to imagine by composition the never-seen com-
pound formed by the box pinned to the wall and the candle
on it.
Link to the neuroscientific and psychological theories
The components of the RIM theory of consciousness,
which are grounded on the fundamental elements of the brain
goal-directed system, can be linked to the main aspects of
the theories of consciousness proposed in the literature and
considered in the previous sections. This section draws some
links between those elements to these aspects as examples,
but many other links can be easily identified.
The global workspace theory (GWT; Baars, 1997) and the
neuronal workspace model (NWM; Dehaene & Changeux,
Figure 2. The four fundamental classes of operations that
can be performed by the representation internal-manipulator
at the core of consciousness.
2011) suggest that the active maintenance of internal repre-
sentations is a fundamental element of consciousness. This
functionality can be related to both the central working mem-
ory component of the RIM theory, and the perceptual work-
ing memories. The two theories also stress the importance
of the amplification of relevant information by higher order
cortices. In particular, the NWM remarks the importance
of the frontal-parietal system for the top-down selection of
information. In the RIM theory, the amplification function
relies on attention processes involving the top-down corti-
cal pathways and also on the selection processes relying on
the basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loops (Granato & Baldas-
sarre, 2019). These selection processes play a crucial role in
the RIM theory as they are at the basis of the internal ma-
nipulation of representations. Both theories stress the impor-
tance of a consciousness bottleneck, for which only one/few
elements at a time enter the focus of attention. In the RIM
theory, representations can take place at multiple levels of
abstraction, so the manipulator has to select only one/few
linked representations at a time to avoid interference between
them.
The convergence-divergence zones theory (CDZt; Dama-
sio, 1989) proposes the existence of a brain multi-level hi-
erarchy for information processing, highlighting the funda-
mental difference between a abstract and perceptual process-
ing and maintenance of information. The RIM theory of con-
sciousness also gives a relevant importance to the hierarchi-
cal processing and maintenance of information, in particular
at the level of abstract working memory and perceptual work-
ing memories, to support the key process of imagination.
The GWT and the NWM, and even more the somatic-
marker hypothesis linked to the CDZt, assign a notable im-
portance to the motivational/emotional processes for guid-
ing conscious processes. In the RIM theory, the motivation
system plays a fundamental role to guide the selections per-
formed by the top-down internal manipulator onto the ab-
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stract and perceptual working memories. In this respect, the
motivation system is at the apex of the hierarchy that ul-
timately establishes which information should be attended
and which manipulations of internal representations should
be performed.
The integrated information theory (IIT; Tononi, 2008)
stresses the features of neural-network and cognitive archi-
tectures that can support conscious processes. We hypothe-
sise that the circuits posited by the RIM theory might have
a high Φ value (Tononi, 2008). In particular, we posit that
in brain the neural assemblies representing the elements rel-
evant for goal-directed processes (e.g., in cortex), and the
loops supporting their internal selection and manipulation
(e.g., based on the cortical circuits and the basal ganglia-
thalamo-cortical loops), should present a high-level of speci-
ficity and integration.
The sensorimotor theory of consciousness (O’Regan &
Noe, 2001) emphasises the relevance for consciousness of
the sensorimotor interaction that conscious agents engage
with the environment, in particular for the role played by the
causal action-outcome correlations that conscious agents can
sense. The closest link that the RIM theory has with this view
is that the theory is a functional theory that posits that con-
sciousness is a process having an adaptive utility for agents
as it allows them to produce more adaptive actions. In par-
ticular, conscious processes allow the flexible manipulation
of internal representations and these support a more effective
planning and a more powerful problem solving. The success
of these processes requires a close alignment between the
agents’ internally manipulated representations and the world
where they act, and a tight sensation-action coupling with it
for action success, as claimed by the sensorimotor theory of
consciousness.
Link to computational and machine-learning models: a
research agenda
In this section we discuss some initial ideas on how the
components of the RIM theory could be implemented in
computational models (Figure 3), while also drafting a pos-
sible research agenda to realise them.
A possibility to implement a computational model follow-
ing the principles of the RIM theory would be to realise a
model capable of performing planning processes as in clas-
sic AI systems, but based on neural networks (Baldassarre,
2001). The use of neural networks, vs. symbolic approaches,
to implement the system would be a condition necessary to
allow the quantitative ‘morphing and warping’ of the internal
representations of the system.
Initially, the system could work on the basis of whole
state/observations representations (Russell & Norvig, 2016)
as commonly done in RL systems (R. S. Sutton & Barto,
1998). This would allow the system to perform simple forms
of planning as in Dyna planning (R. Sutton, 1990), i.e. by
using RL run on the basis of an internal model of the world
rather than in the actual real world (Baldassarre, 2003). This
would require the system to learn a model of the environ-
ment on the basis of experience in the world, either before or
during the accomplishment of desirable goals. Moreover, the
system might be able to initially perform only one-step plans,
involving the processing of the current state, of the goal, and
of actions: this system might already allow the study of some
elements of the internal manipulation of representations that
is central to the theory (we discuss below a model inspired
by the RIM theory exemplifying this).
It would be important to implement this initial system
through the elements of the RIM theory. In particular, the
states of the world should be processed through a generative
model implementing a perceptual working memory, e.g. for
processing visual information (we discuss below a model in-
spired by the RIM theory exemplifying this). The use of a
generative model would allow the system to abstract infor-
mation along the bottom-up information flow and to form
neural representations capturing hidden causes of the per-
cepts, possibly at different levels of abstraction. The top-
down manipulation of these representations would allow the
model to generate (imagine) different percepts. The goal-
driven active imagination of different possible input stimuli
could allow the creative solution of problems (as in the ex-
ample model discussed below). Different generative mod-
els could be used to implement this component, such as Re-
stricted Boltzmann Machines (RBM; Hinton, 2002), varia-
tional autoencoders (VAE; Kingma & Welling, 2013), or
generative adversarial networks (GAN; Goodfellow et al.,
2014).
An abstract working memory component could store per-
sistent representations of the pursued goal, sub-goals, and
other elements relevant for planning (and problem solving,
see below). This component could be implemented through
a recurrent neural network such as a long-short term memory
(LSTM; Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997) or transformers
(Vaswani et al., 2017). The use of the latter model could sup-
port an easier implementation of the internal attention selec-
tive processes needed to manipulate internal representations,
via the manipulator system, thanks to the internal ‘attention
heads’ of such model.
An internal manipulator component would allow the se-
lection of elements needed for planning such as suitable rep-
resentations of the initial state, goals, and actions to perform.
This component could learn to select the internal representa-
tions of the system on the basis of reinforcement learning
(RL) processes. Two strategies might be followed to this
purpose. A first strategy, now successfully used in several
works (e.g., Levine, Finn, Darrell, & Abbeel, 2016; Mnih et
al., 2015), would use an ‘end-to-end’ RL strategy where the
reward is used to train by RL the outer action-oriented part
of the model, and then to use a supervised gradient-based
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Representation Internal-Manipulation (RIM) Implementation Framework
Figure 3. Possible key elements of a RIM theory usable as a framework to build specific computational models. The graph
shows the possible functional components of the theory, and some of the possible machine learning systems that might be used
to implement them.
algorithm to train all layers of the system, here including the
internal manipulation processes, down to the layers close to
the input. A second strategy, that we are exploring at the
moment, is inspired by the functioning of brain where re-
ward signals (e.g., based on dopamine or noradrenaline neu-
romodulators) directly reach, and affect the learning of, the
‘deep layers of the system. This strategy specifically implies
to use reward signals to learn to select by RL not only the
representations of the actions to perform in the environment,
but also the internal representations of the system that affect
the selection of such actions (we are at the moment develop-
ing some models implementing this idea).
A motivation system would furnish the reward signals to
guide the learning of the manipulation processes of the sys-
tem. These rewards might be generated by different possi-
ble mechanisms. They might just be standard rewards, as
those commonly used in RL (R. S. Sutton & Barto, 1998), or
they might be represented by ‘pseudo-rewards’ indicating if
a desired goal has been achieved. Alternatively, they might
be represented by ‘intrinsic rewards’ (Baldassarre & Mirolli,
2013; Barto, Singh, & Chentanez, 2004), or goal-related ‘in-
trinsic pseudo-rewards’, generated by intrinsic motivation
mechanisms (Santucci, Baldassarre, & Mirolli, 2016).
A further step of this research agenda might aim to im-
plement a multi-step planning process allowing the system
to accomplish goals that require a sequence of actions, rather
than one action, to be accomplished (Wayne et al., 2018).
Another fundamental step would be to enhance the sys-
tem to allow it to do the ‘morphing and warping’ of inter-
nal representations advocated by the RIM theory to actively
build lacking knowledge elements that are necessary to solve
challenging problems that go beyond the need for a ‘simple’
planning. Crucially, the system should be able to ‘search’
solutions to problems not only by assembling sequences of
actions, as in planning, but also by changing the internal
representations of the key elements of planning on the ba-
sis of the four internal-manipulation operations of decompo-
sition, composition, abstract, and specification. Generative
models are relevant for this purpose as they show to have a
notable potential to generate novel imagined representations
by manipulating the internal representations capturing rele-
vant hidden causes of learned stimuli (Bau et al., 2019; Klys,
Snell, & Zemel, 2018).
An important means of validation of the principles of the
RIM theory would be to show their capacity to solve prob-
lems that require not only to accomplish goals by planning
(and possibly also to autonomously acquire the knowledge
on the world to support such planning) but also to solve prob-
lems that require elements that have not been previously ex-
perienced/learned by the agent. The system might for ex-
ample be required to modify internal representations of ex-
perienced conditions, objects, and actions to form new ones
allowing the solution of new problems.
The ideas above led us to implement two computational
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models aiming to implement some of the principles of the
RIM theory. A first model (Baldassarre, Lord, Granato, &
Santucci, 2019; see Figure 4) uses decomposition (based on
overt and covert attention processes) to segment an overall
goal into a number of sub-goals that the agent is able to
solve. In particular, a goal assigned to the system required
the creation of a certain configuration of objects in space
(based on a simple custom simulator of simple 2D coloured
circle/triangle/rectangle ‘objects’). The agent could accom-
plish the overall goal by decomposing it into sub-problems
thanks to the independence between the sub-goals: each sub-
goal could be accomplished by re-arranging the single object
in the position and state indicated by the overall goal. The
model could then accomplish each sub-goal through one-
step planning operations involving the performance of single
(hardwired) actions.
A second ‘companion’ model (Granato & Baldassarre,
2019) implements some initial mechanisms to perform ab-
straction and specification. The model reproduces the be-
haviour, and errors, of human participants of the Wisconsin
card sorting test (WCST; Berg, n.d.; Heaton, Chelune, Tal-
ley, Kay, & Curtiss, 1993), a standard neuropsychological
test used to study cognitive flexibility. The model is able
to actively apply abstraction on objects (cards to sort), thus
extracting either their shape, or colour, or size, and then to
search correspondences between objects, with respect to one
of such dimensions, to solve the WCST. The model is in par-
ticular able to employ specification to imagine objects that
are formed by specific attributes, for example to imagine a
small, red, circle. These processes are based on a restricted
Boltzmann machine that perceives cards and, with its ‘hid-
den units’, learns (for now based on a supervised algorithm)
to encode the different shape/colour/size attributes of the ob-
jects depicted on them. The different possible attributes of
the cards are then used to compare them along different di-
mensions and to solve the WCST by inferring the unknown
rule to match the cards through a RL algorithm.
Manipulation agency and the subjective experience of
consciousness
The nature of subjective experience is a widely debated
issue within the philosophical literature. Many philosophers
propose different ideas to explain the uniqueness of sub-
jective experience such as the ‘zombie argumentation’ of
Chalmers (Chalmers, 2003), for which any physicalist ex-
planation of subjective experience is deemed to fail, the
red room mental experiment of Searle (Searle, 2004), warn-
ing against the possibility of processing information without
having a deep grasp of the process, or the list of fundamen-
tal features of qualia, i.e. private subjective sensations, of
Dennet (Dennett, 1988).
Some scientific theories of consciousness point to what
should be the fundamental elements of subjective experience,
for example through the concept of ‘qualia space’, a compu-
tational model capturing the functioning of brain thalamo-
cortical networks at the basis of consciousness (Tononi,
2008); the drawing of a close link between visual experience
and embodied sensorimotor loops (O’Regan & Noe, 2001);
the emotional dimension of conscious experience (Damasio,
1996); or the dynamics of a complex distributed frontal-
parietal brain network proposed within the GWT (Baars et
al., 2013; Seth, Baars, & Edelman, 2005) and NWM (De-
haene & Naccache, 2001). While we think that each of these
proposals highlights a fundamental aspect of the subjective
elements of conscious experience, it seems that they still re-
main unclear and that the RIM theory of consciousness pro-
posed here might contribute to better understand them.
Based on the RIM theory, a conscious agent intentionally
controls the representation internal-manipulator to create an
internal simulated reality at will. This manipulation has a
notable power as it relies on the four flexible primitive op-
erations of manipulations illustrated above that can trans-
form and warp internal representations in arbitrary ways.
This power allows the agent to also internally simulate it-
self, e.g. based on images involving other similar agents:
these might be possibly abstracted along various dimensions
and then added, by composition, some features related to
oneself, including elements of own cognition (Fernandez-
Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000).
An key point of our view is that, based on mechanisms as
those operating for the actions exerted on the external world,
conscious agents have a sense of agency for the actions ex-
erted through the internal manipulator on the internal reality
generated by imagination. We call this manipulation agency.
The internally simulated and manipulated realty relies on
imagination that involves also the lowest-level perceptual
representations. The representations that the internal manip-
ulator acts on are largely overlapped to those activated by the
perception of the real world: this activation thus produces a
vivid perceptual and emotional experiences similar to those
produced by experiences in the real world. These processes
are at the basis of the human intuition that we have an exclu-
sive private access to our conscious thoughts, a fundamental
feature of the concept of Qualia (Dennett, 1988, 2001).
To summarise, the RIM theory posits that the subjective
experience of consciousness relies on the operations of the
goal-driven representation internal-manipulator that allow
the agent to intentionally create, and powerfully manipu-
late as desired, an internal reality that possibly includes el-
ements of the agent itself and has the perceptual and emo-
tional vividness of the outer world.
The concept of manipulation agency could also be used
to propose a possible ‘consciousness scale’. Increasing lev-
els of manipulation agency could characterise three states
of: phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, and
manipulative consciousness (Figure 5). The three levels
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Figure 4. Key elements of previous computational models that implemented some elements of the RIM theory. (Left) The
model that can perform a decomposition of some types of goals into sub-goals based on decomposition (Baldassarre et al.,
2019). (Right) The model that performs selected types of abstraction and specification of input images (Granato & Baldassarre,
2019).
of manipulation agency could characterise different neuro-
cognitive states accompanying three typical mental process-
ing modes. In particular, an unexpected event could cause the
transitory perception accompanied by a low level of control
and manipulation agency. Mind-wandering, a common brain
mode leading to explore sequences of conscious thoughts,
and accompanying the performance of routine automatic ac-
tivities or causing a mental shift from a specific tasks, often
happening without awareness (Schooler et al., 2011), might
be characterised by a medium level of manipulation agency.
At last, a high attention focus characterising states of mind
as those achieved with mindfulness could be accompanied
by the highest level of control on own cognition and hence
of manipulation agency.
Our proposal could also clarify the difference between
pseudo-hallucinations (which do not mimic real perception
and are perceived as unreal), and hallucinations (percep-
tion in the absence of external stimuli, having the quality
of real perception, Telles-Correia, Moreira, & Goncalves,
2015). In particular, different alternations of manipulation
agency could explain the presence of insight in pseudohallu-
cinations, and its lack in true hallucinations. These states are
also reported in (Figure 5) to indicate the levels of manipula-
tion agency possibly corresponding to them. The scale could
also characterise dreams, involving uncontrolled imagination
during REM sleep, and lucid dreams, involving controlled
imagination during sleep (Stumbrys, Erlacher, Schädlich, &
Schredl, 2012).
Figure 5. A scale of consciousness based on the concept of
manipulation agency.
Conclusions
We introduced the representation internal-manipulation
(RIM) theory of consciousness. The theory views conscious
processes as playing a key adaptive function for flexible plan-
ning and problem solving. The theory pivots on the idea that
the processes of consciousness support the internal manipu-
lation of representations of all aspects of goal-directed pro-
cesses, from the representations of objects, to those of goals,
actions, and plans. This manipulation relies on four cardi-
nal operations (decomposition, composition, abstraction, and
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specification) that allow conscious representation manipula-
tion to build new knowledge on the basis of previously ac-
quired experience, a process called here conscious knowl-
edge transfer.
We discussed how the RIM theory integrates various as-
pects of some main theories of consciousness, in particular
by linking them to different elements of goal-directed pro-
cesses at the basis of the theory. We also discussed prelimi-
nary ideas on the possible computational implementation of
some elements of the theory based on current machine learn-
ing systems, and we briefly reviewed initial computational
models implemented to capture some of the theory ideas.
Finally, we used the theory to propose a new interpretation
of the subjective elements of conscious experience by relying
on the new concept of manipulation agency. This indicates
the sense that humans have of being able to manipulate as
desired, in powerful ways, an internal imagined reality that
possibly includes oneself and that is vividly sensed and felt
as the outer world.
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